


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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

State Dept. review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

*Laos: [Neutralist elements are suspicious of right-wing intentions and see little prospect for an early solution to the present government crisis.]



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[Another neutralist official, Minister of Interior Pheng Phongsavan, remains in the Soviet Embassy where he fled following the coup. He has refused to join Souvanna on the grounds that his personal safety is not assured.]

[Premier Souvanna, who publicly has expressed confidence that things will work out, has remarked to friends that if the coup leaders continue to "look over his shoulders and negotiate his decisions," there would be little purpose in continuing his efforts.]

[Rightist elements, meanwhile, still appear to retain effective control over the government.]

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[Souvanna must clear all "major decisions" with the coup committee. Aware of Western opposition to the coup and continued support for Souvanna, the committee reportedly has decided to give the neutralist premier some latitude of action in an effort to improve its standing in Western eyes.]

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Panama: Tensions aroused by the recent canal crisis have deeply affected internal Panamanian politics and there may be violence before the presidential elections scheduled for 10 May.

US Ambassador Vaughn reports a profound and widespread mood of uneasiness in Panama, and a growing awareness that this election involves far more than the traditional power shift within a small circle.

The ambassador believes that the controversial Arnulfo Arias is still ahead in the presidential campaign. The ruling group remains split behind government candidate Marco Robles and Juan de Arco Galindo. There is renewed speculation that supporters of Galindo, who seems to be trailing, may be making a deal with Arnulfo in the expectation that he will defeat Robles.

Arnulfo has told his Panamenista Party (PP) followers to retaliate against attacks from Robles' armed squads which the PP expects will begin on 7 May. At least some violence, which could spread quickly, seems inevitable. National Guard Commandant Vallarino, Arnulfo's bitterest enemy, apparently is no longer sure he can count on his men to repress any outbreaks, which the PP would probably contrive to give the appearance of being a popular revolt.

The settlement of the banana workers' long strike in Chiriqui Province on 3 May will strengthen both Robles and pro-Communist Assembly candidate Carlos Ivan Zuniga, the union's legal adviser. The settlement tends to confirm reports that Zuniga and Robles made a deal recently to improve their political chances in Chiriqui, Arnulfo Arias' home province.

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6 May 64

DAILY BRIEF

3

British Guiana - Trinidad: [Trinidad's Prime Minister Williams is trying to mediate the differences between British Guiana's warring political leaders, but the prospects of his succeeding are uncertain.]

[At Williams' invitation, Jagan arrived in Trinidad on 2 May. He was in a "confused, rattled, and nervous" state and requested Williams to mediate. United Force (UF) leader Peter D'Aguiar has also reportedly accepted an invitation to Port of Spain, but the response of People's National Congress (PNC) leader Forbes Burnham is unknown.]

[Williams has long been disturbed by Jagan's Communist tendencies, and told the US ambassador in Port of Spain that he believes "some action" must now be taken to avert chaos in British Guiana. Williams said he hopes to persuade Jagan to be more "sensible." Williams' motives are probably mixed, but he presumably is out to gain whatever personal prestige he can.]

[Williams states that he believes the first steps toward a solution might be to form a coalition government, to revise the constitution along the lines of Trinidad's in order to protect racial minorities, and to postpone the proportional representation elections London is planning for later this year.]

[These ideas are consistent with proposals previously made by Jagan, who is apparently grasping at any straw in his effort to remain in power. The PNC and UF, however, hope to win the elections, and may not want to compromise.]

[If all else fails, Williams said he feels that it might, in the long run, be necessary to remove Jagan from the political scene in British Guiana.]

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6 May 64

DAILY BRIEF

*Dominican Republic: Three of the country's leading opposition parties are attempting to turn the current illegal strike into a move to oust the provisional government.

Deployment of 2,000 government troops in Santo Domingo has diminished prospects of serious violence. The strike, however, is developing into a test of political strength between the ruling triumvirate, which favors a period of calm before calling new elections, and opposition political groups, which do not believe the present regime will ever allow truly fair elections.

An unlikely coalition of ex-President Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), ex-President Balaguer's Reformist Party (PR), and the non-Communist leftist Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), which has important labor and student support, appears to be collaborating in support of the strike. Extreme leftists also are involved.

The three parties are seeking to dump the triumvirate and impose a formula which would bring Bosch back as interim president and reinstall the 1963 Congress with reduced PRD membership. This formula is unlikely to get far, but major antigovernment actions by the opposition coalition could provoke harsh repressive measures by government forces.

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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LAOS



NOTES

North Vietnam - Laos - South Vietnam: Hanoi continues to make substantial supply deliveries to south-central Laos, apparently to ensure ample stocks for Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in the area before the rainy season makes roads impassable. Aerial photography of 3 May reveals at least 63 trucks moving south in North Vietnam toward Laos on Route 12, and another 65 parked in the convoy staging area at Bai Duc Thou, 24 miles from the Laos border. Some of these supplies may be destined for South Vietnam via Routes 12A and 9.7

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Turkey: Military forces in southern Turkey today began "Exercise Attila," a three-day operation which a Turkish newspaper describes as the country's greatest combined maneuver. Land, sea, and air force units, previously alerted for possible action in Cyprus, are involved in a major amphibious operation in the Gulf of Iskenderun. Like similar exercises since the Cyprus crisis began last December, "Attila" is designed both to provide training and to demonstrate Turkey's readiness to intervene in Cyprus.


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[REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board approved the following special national intelligence estimate on 2 May 1964:

SNIE 85-2-64: "Likelihood of an Attempted
Shoot-down of a U-2."

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DAILY BRIEF

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THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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